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ARGUMENT 
Appellee has advanced five positions: (1) there is no basis for considering 
Appellant's constitutional issues because they were not preserved below; (2) even if they 
were to be considered by this Court, they lack merit because Appellant has no property 
interest in the survivor annuity, and all constitutional processes "due" were offered at the 
hearing below; (3) Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 has been misread by Appellant because, 
at the time of Mr. Montierth's death, he was a "retiree," not a member; (4) the AHO did 
consider the hearsay testimony of Appellant, and a specific finding in respect of that issue 
- "intent" - is not necessary; (5) with regard to the incomplete Retirement Application, it 
is sufficient to point out that Mr. Montierth's signature on Page 1 was notarized. 
I. THERE IS NO LEGAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A "RIGHT" TO THE 
RETIREMENT BENEFIT, A "PROPERTY INTEREST" IN THE RETIREMENT 
BENEFIT, A "VESTED" PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE RETIREMENT 
BENEFIT, OR A "CONTRACTUALLY VESTED INTEREST" IN THE 
RETIREMENT BENEFIT. 
In Appellant's Opening Brief, she went to some length to demonstrate the 
evolution and development of the courts' recognition, both here, and in California, of a 
non-employee spouse's legal interest in her husband's retirement benefit. After 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) there should be no dispute that Mrs. 
Montierth had a legally protected interest in the retirement benefit, which virtually is 
recognized in all Utah dissolution decrees. Appellee argues, however, in syllogistic 
fashion, that actually, Appellant has no interest whatsoever. The argument is best 
appreciated on Page 12 of the Board's Brief. 
1 
a- Public pension and retirement systems give rise to vested contractual rights. 
b. These vested contractual rights constitute a property interest. 
c. Accordingly, a person who has no vested contractual right does not have a 
property interest. 
Therefore: Because Appellant did not have a vested contractual right, she has no 
property interest. 
Fascinating logic, to say the least. The problem, of course, is that the syllogism 
ends with conclusion "c". The statement about Appellant is a complete non-sequitur, 
disconnected to the major and minor premises above. Blithely stating that she does not 
have a property interest begs the central inquiry, ignores both Woodward, supra, the 
cases Appellee itself has marshaled to support its argument: Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public 
Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State of Utah, 
2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), is squarely at odds with Section 49-13-405, and explicitly 
contradicts a central premise of Appellee's own argument. 
Not necessarily in order of importance, we first examine Horn v. Utah Dep 7 of 
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1998). In Horn, the issue was whether the 
plaintiff could use the Personnel Management Act, and implementing regulations, to 
establish an employment contract. The court said no, explaining that the contractually 
vested rights (to pension and retirement benefits) of a plan member are not analogous to 
statutory rights. Id. at 100. The court also remarked that retirement benefits "vest" when 
the employee attains retirement age. Id. 
2 
In Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State of Utah 2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), the 
Supreme Court, against the backdrop of thousands of angry public employees, wrestled 
with whether a pending bill retroactively could alter the "cash-in or transfer" policy then 
applicable to sick leave benefits upon employment termination. The technical question, 
Judge Wilkins wrote, was whether the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a "taking" 
under the due process clause, which question, in turn, rested on whether plaintiffs had a 
protectable property interest in redeeming banked sick leave hours in a particular way. 
IdM 12. Ultimately, the court said the employees did not. Both decisions, when read 
together as respects this case, recite first, the obvious: vesting occurs when pre-vesting 
conditions have been met; and, second, they fortify Appellant's claim, by re-emphasizing 
that her husband had a contractually vested right to his retirement benefits, which, 
following Woodward, means she had the same right. 
It is clear that Wes Montierth's retirement benefits vested; indeed he paid $35,817 
to ensure that. (Transcript, pp. 38, 39, 42). We have demonstrated conclusively through 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), Estate of Frank Annelo, Jr. v. 
McQueen, et al, 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998), and Culbertson v. Continental Assurance 
Co.,631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981), that without reservation, Utah courts recognize a non-
employee spouse's "right to" retirement benefits - once they vest. When Mr. Montierth's 
retirement benefits vested, so did Appellant's pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).l She is on equal footing with her husband regarding accrual and 
1
 Appellee continues to resist this clear principle. On Page 46, n. 18, it writes: "Mr. 
Montierth owns any claim that he failed to complete the retirement application in some 
3 
vesting. Third, the Utah legislature has so clearly recognized this concept, that it has 
legislated a non-employee spouse's right to retirement benefits even if they do not 
technically vest. As we know, Section 49-13-405 bestows the annuity on a non-
employee spouse if her husband dies before retirement, thus explicitly recognizing the 
spouse's interest in, and right to, the benefit as it accrues year to year. The Board appears 
mistakenly mesmerized by the concept of "vesting" when Woodward clearly stated the 
term is not definitive as a test of a spouse's claim to retirement property. Id. at 432-33. 
The Board is left in the contradictory position of administering a retirement system 
that "gives" a non-employee spouse an annuity, pursuant to §49-13-405, prior to 
retirement "vesting," conceding that the retirement benefit of Appellant's husband vested 
upon his retirement, acknowledging that under In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 
544 P.2d 561 (1976); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Estate of 
Frank Annelo, Jr. v. McQueen, et al., 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998) and progeny, the 
concept of vesting is deemed irrelevant, and that both spouses have a protectable right to 
and interest in, retirement benefits, yet clinging to the indefensible position that Appellant 
has "no standing" to raise the instant claim because she does not have what they term is a 
way," implying that only Mr. Montierth can have an interest in the benefit. Appellee's 
brief is replete with the assumption that Mrs. Montierth had no right to retirement 
benefits because: only a "member" can obtain vesting rights, only a "member" can 
submit a retirement application, and only a "member" has "contributions on deposit." 
Appellee's Brief, p. 38. The Board loses sight of the fact that retirement benefits vest, 
not members. The logical implication of the Board's view is that non-employee spouses 
in Utah have no right to the cars, home or checking account of their husband solely 
because he purchased them. 
4 
'Vested ijiiilfiklii.ii i if»:lii ' llh 1 board's argument is baffling, and internally 
contradictory. 
In response, Appellee argues, on Pages 34-39, that any reliance on Woodward is 
misplaced because: (1) Woodward only stands foi the proposition I lint "non-vested" 
retirement benefits may be included in a marital estate; (2) the non-employee spouse has 
only a speculative potential contract right; (3) this "right to" does not exist until a court 
order so decrees; (4) a "right to" a percentage of the retirement benefit is not a property 
right; and (5) Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-612(3)(a) proves this. Short shrift can be made of 
this improbable logic. First, a retirement benefit is property, personal property and so 
deemed by Utah courts. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed (1999), p. 1252, defines property 
as 1:1:le right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing: i.e., a right to ownership. 
Personal property means any movable or intangible thing subject to ownership and not 
classified as real property. The Woodward court, in discussing retirement benefits and 
vesting, said "[it] . . . is an inappropriate basis for determining what property should be 
subject to equitable division .. . ." Id. at 432-33. In Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 
831 (Utah App. 1988), the court held: ". . . retirement benefits accrued in whole or in 
part during marriage constitiite mutual property iiiider the Utah law . . . " (emphasis 
added). To be sure, as in thousands of related or unrelated cases, it may take a court 
order to distribute the property equitably, but a court does not create the right as the 
Board confuses itself by so stating on Page 36, it enforces the riglit Fiilally, Section 49-
11-612(3)(a) actually disproves the Board's assertion. This section expressly recognized 
5 
the "right to" defined contributions, allowances, death benefits, refunds by non-employee 
spouses, once it is directed "how" to divide them by a court. 
Appellee also asserts that because Appellant is not a member (i.e., one who makes 
contributions) "she cannot. . . obtain a vested right, and thus maintains no individual 
property interest in her husband's retirement benefit." Appellee Brief, p. 39. It is hard to 
appreciate just how confused this reasoning is. It is the retirement benefit that vests, not 
members; they (along with their spouses) only own the right to the benefit. The 
Montierth retirement benefit did vest. Both Appellant and her husband therefore have a 
"right to" this vested benefit under Utah law. Indeed, both began securing a legally 
recognized right to this benefit from the first day the benefit started to accrue: "to the 
extent the right has so accrued, it is subject to equitable distribution." Woodward at 432-
33. 
II. WAIVER, CLEAR ERROR AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, 
Understandably, the bulk of Appellee's 47-page brief is spent arguing that 
Appellant has no standing to bring the constitutional arguments not articulated below.2 
Appellee's somewhat repetitive argument misses completely the point advanced by 
Appellant and inexplicably does not even address two key issues. 
A. Criminal Cases Have Limited Applicability 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) [aggravated sexual abuse]; State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4 (Utah 2006) [aggravated robbery]; State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 48 
2
 The record is clear that the associate representing Mrs. Montierth at the hearing did not 
raise them. 
6 
P.JQ 9 J I (utan zuol ; i ild sodomy]; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) [second 
degree murder]; State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) [sexual abuse]; State v. 
Buford, 820 P.2d 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) [possession of controlled substance]; State 
v. Holgate, 2000 Ul ?.| 10 1' nl ) l<> (i Kali :<M)0i JiinirtK 11 an all uiiuiii.il cases. • 
Certainly, they enrich the waiver discussion, but their holdings are limited for two 
reasons. First, each case dealt with a piece of evidence, or testimony, to which no 
objection was lodged at trial Here, there is no claim of improperly admitted evidence, 
and no failed objection to analyze. Second, the policy consideration which supports 
waiver in these cases - that the trial judge should be given the opportunity to bring his/her 
experience and independent judgment to the objection ~ again, is not present in this case. 
One can hardly equate an AHO, employed by the Board, or better yet, the Board itself (as 
final adjudicative officer), to an independent state court judge whose experience and 
principally based decision might assist the appellate court greatly. Indeed, we hear no 
argument from the Board, now sitting as Appellee advocate, that had it been given the 
opportunity below, it might have sustained a constitutional challenge to its own actions or 
administrative regulations. This silence conclusively exposes, as pretense, any 
implicatu t raising the arguments at (in hearing would have helped. In short, the 
foundational pillars upon which the waiver argument rests, in a criminal case, are simply 
absent here. 
B. The Exceptions to Waiver are not Technical 
The Board goes to considerable effort to demonstrate that there are two, and only 
two, exceptions to waiver - plain error and exceptional circumstance, and that both are 
7 
demanding in precision. Actually, the opposite is the case, certainly with regard to 
exceptional circumstances. 
The Archambeau court, which invariably is cited by all cases including the Utah 
Supreme Court, admitted that realistically the "exception categories" are "sufficiently 
broad to encompass any situation requiring a Utah appellate court's consideration of a 
constitutional issue, for the first time, in the interests of justice." State of Utah v. 
Archambeau,&20 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court explained that this 
"catchall" exception works as a "safety device". Archambeau at 923. The Utah Supreme 
Court echoed this approach just two years ago. 
Recently, we have applied the exception sparingly, reserving it for 
the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an 
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted 
in manifest injustice. The Court of Appeals has aptly characterized 
the concept as a "safety device" against injustice, (citing 
Archambeau) 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 191 (Utah 2004). See also, State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 (Utah 1993), (we have discretion to address claims not raised 
at trial under exceptional circumstances and to avoid a miscarriage of justice). 
With regard to plain error, in an advertent way, the Board has boot-strapped its 
own argument with respect to this doctrine, particularly if the test is subjective. Under 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the error must be obvious 
3
 In a confusing discussion on Pages 17-18, n. 4, the Board argues that the concept of 
manifest injustice may be confined to objections raised under Rule 19(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Board's analysis is based on State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 
55, n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), but nothing in Irwin is so limiting. 
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to the trier of fact. If the Board cannot understand the Appellant's constitutional claims 
here, on appeal, infra, when they have been spelled out in detail, it seems particularly true 
that they would not have been obvious to either the AHO or the Board below. 
C. The Board Failed to Respond to the "bxceptional Circumstance Advanced by 
Appellant. 
Important by its absence, the Board mentioned only in passing "the 
circumstances" Appellant has offered as exceptional, yet this analysis should have been 
the centerpiece of its response. The sole reference is found on Page 31, n. 12. The Board 
simply identifies them, and then dismisses their importance as being "modest" examples 
only, and not previously recognized by appellate courts. 
The underlying merits of this case are so compelling, and the damage to the 
Montierth family so great, however, these alone would warrant initial review on appeal. 
A mother and four children have now lost their lifetime source of income, over $800,000. 
They were relegated to this position because the Board failed to give her notice, or 
opportunity to object, to her husband's election of Plan 1, which stripped her of a benefit 
all courts in Utah definitively say she has: a right to public retirement benefits. At 
another level going forward, the system the Board has used, and is using, to administer its 
retirement-election-survivor-annuity program is devoid of any "notice and opportunity to 
object" mechanism; it is not Montierth specific. Hence, this system, or lack thereof, does 
presently, and will hereinafter continue, to impact scores of women each year who are 
disenfranchised by a sloppy, unstable or deliberately uncharitable husband. Because this 
flavor of constitutional denial will continue into the future, it takes the instant 
9 
"circumstances" completely out of the normal case-specific injury category. Whether 
exceptional circumstances, manifest injustice, or in the interests of justice, is the correct 
label, is immaterial; the catchall niche of the waiver doctrine appears inescapable in this 
special context. And yet, the Board did not devote a single line to these circumstances. 
Rather, it dismissively stated "Petitioner cannot point to any exceptional circumstances . . 
. to invoke the exception." (Appellee Brief, p. 31). That was it. 
Also ignored by the Board is an equally compelling reason to trump the waiver 
doctrine. The very heart of the policy supporting waiver is the assumption that timely 
raising an issue will allow the trial court to deal with it, perhaps even resolve the issue. 
But as alluded to above, that consideration is nowhere to be found in this setting. It is 
highly improbable that an AHO would ever conclude that the Board's pre-election 
retirement scheme was unconstitutional, no matter how scintillating the argument 
advanced. And certainly the Board, by rigidly defending its actions here as a party 
litigant, cannot now protest that, had it heard these very claims when it was sitting as 
"final arbiter" six months ago, it might have ruled against itself.4 
Finally, and dispositive, Utah courts have held, without exception, that little, or no, 
deference is paid to the Board's analysis of legal issues. Gottfredson v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 808 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 1991) stated it best: because the appeal 
presents an issue of law "we therefore apply a correction-of-error standard where we 
extend no deference to the agency's conclusions." To the same effect is Horton v. Utah 
4
 It is telling to note that, if the Board had thought any position of Appellant was 
meritorious on appeal, it would have sought a remand from this Court to consider the 
case. It did not. 
10 
State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1992). In Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Utah 1980), noted previously, the court 
cynically, but accurately, observed that agencies do not generally determine the 
constitutional! Uieir organic legislation. 
Both the Board's unlikely independence as a trier of fact, and the limited 
deference given to its legal interpretations of constitutional law, reinforce the injunction 
of futility. The doctrine of futility is invoked both successfully and unsuccessfully in 
many contexts by Utah courts. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 104:. 1046 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) (leave to amend unnecessary if futile); Hipwell v. IHC Hospital, 82 
P.3d 1076 (Utah 2003) (motion to amend futile if new action is moot); Patterson Const 
v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7; 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003) (futility of exhausting 
administrative remedies, denied); First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, et al, 858 P.2d 
958 (Utah 1993) (motion to lift stay an exercise in futility, dissent); State of Utah v. Dale, 
681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) (futility of ruling on two motions on the same ground); Rice, 
Melby Enterprises v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982) (entering into contract, 
because of the futility of refusing to do so); Ludahl v. Larson, 586 P.2d 439 (Utah 1978) 
(request, even if granted, would make no difference); Mills v. Gronning, et al, 581 P.2d 
1334 (Utah 1978) (for employee to have a "good cause" basis for his grievance, he must 
first attempt to work out problem); Nuzum, et al v. Construction and Mining Corp., et 
al, 566 P.2d I I I ! 111 tali 1997) (an appellate review would be futile if it amounted to 
rubber-stamping Industrial Commission orders); L. W. Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Const, 509 
P.2d 356 (Utah 1973) (futility of a trial by a jury, if judge is going to set it aside); State of 
11 
Utah v. Belwood, 494 P.2d 519 (Utah 1972) (no reason to grant a new trial solely on a 
technical error, if the result will be the same). A review of some fifty Utah cases on this 
point show that there is no elegance to the definition of futility: it is simply invoked 
whenever common sense demonstrates that the challenged action, or lack thereof, would 
not have mattered anyway. 
Thus, with respect to each "exceptional circumstance'"' - the catastrophic harm to 
the Montierth family - the ongoing nature of the problem statewide - the obvious 
implausibility of the Board ruling against itself below - and the lack of deference paid to 
the Board's legal analysis by Utah courts - the Appellee was non-responsive. Whether it 
misunderstood the importance of this piece, or simply had nothing to offer, its silence is 
particularly remarkable on a key issue. 
III. THE BOARD HAS CONFUSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES HERE 
BEING CHALLENGED. 
The Board has organized a very effective argument that due process 
considerations were fully met in the context of the administrative hearing. On Pages 11 
and 12, and on Pages 33-34 , the Board argues successfully that Appellant had a right to 
counsel, did have counsel, received notice of the hearing, called a witness, and presented 
argument.5 The Appellee concludes " . . . Petitioner received all the process she was 
5
 The key section heading reads " . . . The Board Granted Petitioner Constitutional 
Procedural Due Process by Granting Her a Full and Fair Hearing." The title is pregnant 
with one implication. It does not matter what the Board failed to do constitutionally in 
processing the retirement selection; all is cured by affording an administrative hearing. 
12 
due " This statement is correct, but completely irrelevant. There is no claim of due 
process denial at the hearing. 
The issue, indeed the epicenter of Appellant's Brief, is the constitutional denial of 
notice and opportunity to object to her husband's pre-retirement selection on August 16, 
2002, two years before the hearing. This argument is spelled out in detail on pages 11-14 
in Montierth's Brief, in a section entitled: "HI. Petitioner Has Been Deprived of Property 
in Violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions By Failing to Provide Notice and 
Opportunity to Object" The only rejoinder offered by the Board to the precise 
constitutional question advanced by Appellant is found on Page 33. The Board simply 
noted: The argument "makes no cognitive sense." It did i i.c >t explain or defend its pre-
retirement application system. It simply said nothing. Although it is unclear why, in 47 
pages of brief the Board devoted but a single sentence to the issue, seemingly oblivious to 
the importance of the argument. Indeed, it came close to insulting the Montierth family 
by stating: "One must wonder what kind of harm Petitioner believes that she has suffered 
by not being able to bring a claim at the time her husband made his retirement plan 
election (since she was able to challenge it after he died)." Appellee Brief, p. 34. 
Perhaps Mrs. Montierth and her four minor children could "wonder" about the loss 
of $800,000, for starters. Either the Board conceded the argument, or became so 
enamored with an easier, but irrelevant target - due process at the hearing ~ that it 
i oiiiplelcly missed the issue. Thus, in sequence, first exceptional circumstances, and now 
the constitutional issues, the Board has chosen not to confront a linchpin Appellant 
position. 
13 
IV. POINT BY POINT REJOINDER TO UNRELATED POSITIONS 
ADVANCED BY THE BOARD. 
A number of arguments or statements advanced by the Board are better handled by 
subsection rejoinders. 
A, Hearsay or Not Hearsay. 
Hearsay, in any context, can be difficult, but when the issue is "belief," it is often 
black ice. The question is Mr. Montierth's belief as to what he did, not what he said he 
did, not what he did. As we tried to state precisely on page 17: the statement he made to 
his wife (that she would be covered if he died) was offered to demonstrate that he 
actually believed he had selected a plan that protected Appellant. There was no other 
evidence as respects what he believed he had done - only the application showing what 
he did. Mistakenly, the Board takes this as direct evidence of intent: "Mr. Montierth's 
notarized statement. . . shows his express intent to select retirement Plan One." Appellee 
Brief, page 20, n. 6. No, it only shows that he signed the document. Mr. Monti erth never 
said he made a mistake. Just the opposite, he seemed to express the belief that he had 
correctly chosen a plan which contained a survivor annuity. The importance of this piece 
of evidence is apparent when coupled with the incomplete Application for Service 
Retirement. Neither the AHO nor the Board ever directly confronted the obvious 
connection between the two when it made its finding... (no evidence to support the 
claim that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected Plan 1). 
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B. Incomplete Application for Retirement Benefits. 
Given the reinforcement by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Public Employees 
Association v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), that public employee pension and 
retirement benefits are contractual in nature, tl le ii ICOI i iplete " Vpplicatioi I for Ser\ ice 
Retirement" becomes all the more important. Since there is a clear issue going to what 
Mr. Montierth believed he was doing, then page 2 of the Application (the contract), 
which relates specifically to "understanding the choice made" becomes all the more 
important in establishing the "meeting of the minds" requirement of contract formation. 
The Board's answer to this assertion is found on Page 14 of its Brief. Citing Utah Code 
Ann. §49-13-401 the Board argues that once Appellant's husband submitted a notarized 
signature and a selection retirement date, the "retirement application was complete." The 
Board dismisses, without comment, any mention of the second page. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401(b) is a "qualifying" predicate to eligibility, it hardly 
speaks to the issue raised. Second, the document remains problematical as an inspection 
shows. It is signed on August 16, 2002, yet the 16 of July, one month earlier, is selected 
as a retirement date, and apparently he had not worked since May 30* , two months 
earlier. The box above his signature reads, "I understand tl le Hi i litations as described on 
the reverse side of this form." However, the absence of his signature on the reverse side, 
which reads, "The above statements and options have been reviewed with me by a 
counselor," deepens the suspicion that it was filled out quickly with no care, 
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completeness or understanding. Despite this deficiency, this is "the" document the 
Board produces as conclusive evidence that Mr. Montierth waived his wife's right to an 
$800,000 survivor annuity. We recall at this juncture the observations of Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah App. 1990) that this document 
represents ". . . the irrevocable one-in-a-lifetime retirement decision . . . (which) imposes 
a strict duty of certitude upon those charged with the supervision and implementation of 
the system." At the very least Montierth is owed an explanation as to why this second 
page remained unsigned. But at a more fundamental level, why, we ask rhetorically, is 
the Board's stringent duty as a fiduciary left in the hands of administrators who only 
"presume" that the retiring member understands his selection, and who make no effort to 
scrutinize, question and carefully explain the consequences of an election, particularly 
one that disenfranchises a spouse. It is recalled that Mrs. Montierth's name is clearly set 
out no page one. 
C. Not Designating the Section Being Reviewed Under §63-46b-15(4). 
The admonition in King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287 n.7 
(Utah App. 1993)7 is well taken, but realistically not in play in the instant matter because 
Appellant's attack is broadly constitutional in nature and does not focus on a specific 
Board interpretation of a statute. In King, the claimant sought reversal of the IC's order 
6
 Charged with fiduciary responsibility, and given the fact that the second page 
admonition is of the Board's own creation, it is exasperating that the Appellee simply 
ignores page two. To the same effect is the statement on Page 47 of its Brief to the effect 
that Montierth did not present a "scintilla" of evidence to show that page two was 
incomplete. It is almost as though the Board tries to "pretend-away" evidence or law it 
does not like. 
7
 The correct citation is n.6. 
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denying him temporary disability. The question in King, unlike here, was what standard 
of review is applicable when the court reviews a Board interpretation of a statute with 
respect to which discretion has been granted. The court did re-emphasize the review 
standard applicable here: "The standard we apply when an agency interprets or applies 
general law . . . constitutional law . . . our review . . . (is) a correction of error standard, 
giving no deference to the agency's decision." Id. at 1285. See also, Epperson v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd, 949 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App. 1997). 
The Board also cites Utah Code Ann. §49-11-203(l)(k) on page 5 of its Brief, for 
the proposition that because the Board is charged to develop broad policies and programs, 
its interpretation must be upheld if reasonable and rational. That may be true, but for the 
same reasons just explicated, is irrelevant here: The Board did not interpret anything. 
D. The Reach and Implication of Section 49-13-405(2) 
Appellant has argued that on its face, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) allows a 
spouse to request that her husband be deemed to have retired under Plan Three when he 
dies. Appellee, as anticipated, claims, on Page 19 of its Brief, that Utah Code Ann. §49-
13-405(2) is limited to members who die before retirement, relying on the definition of 
"member" in Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(23)(a).8 The Board explains the policy behind 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) as follows: "Those members with long-term service to 
the public who die not having retired and selected a retirement option, are allowed a 
continuing benefit to their spouse," while those who have elected a plan are excluded. 
8
 The Board cites incorrectly to §49-11-102(22) which applies to inactive members. 
Appellee Brief, p. 19. 
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(Appellee Brief, p. 40). Yes, that accurately describes what happens, but it doesn't 
explain why it happens. The real problem with allowing Mrs. Montierth the same right, 
argues the Board, is that it would frustrate the "actuarial soundness" of the Plan. The 
Board is concerned that all plan participants would elect option one which pays out a 
slightly higher monthly benefit, then switch to Plan 3 upon death. That concern, which 
can be real, is easily remedied by offsets down the line, which Appellant specifically 
requested. (See letter of February 15, 2005, from Crofts to Newman). The difference in 
treatment, we submit, remains unconvincing since it creates two classes of spouses with 
identical constitutional rights. One receives a survivor annuity, even though the 
retirement benefit has not technically vested because of the premature death of her 
spouse. The second receives nothing, even though the retirement benefit has vested, 
because of the sloppy, unstable or deliberate lack of charity of her husband. Both 
spouses are innocent of any wrongdoing, and neither participated in a retirement selection 
decision. 
V. THE BOARD CONCEDED KEY ARGUMENTS BY FAILING TO 
RESPOND. 
Despite the length and breadth of the Board's Brief, it ignored a panoply of central 
arguments advanced by Appellant. 
It failed to respond to the "exceptional circumstances" set forth by Appellant (the 
harm to the Montierths, etc.), or the futility of presenting the constitutional issues below. 
Instead, it ground away at the technical requirements of plain error in the context of 
criminal cases. It missed, or misunderstood, the nature of the constitutional challenge, 
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focusing instead on due process requirements at the hearing. It tiptoed around State of 
Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), a case cited by all courts, which 
held that waiver could be overcome "in the interests of justice." Indeed on Page 17 of its 
Brief, it denied the holding: "This is simply untrue." It never explained, or defended, a 
system that fails to provide a non-employee spouse with an opportunity to review her 
husband's retirement plan selection before she is divested, or the obvious inconsistency 
between that system, and the policy under §49-13-405(2), which awards a survivor 
benefit to wives of "members" prior to vesting. It ignored, without comment, the 
prevailing Utah law requiring clear and specific waivers before property rights can be 
relinquished. It did not rebut Appellant's argument that the Board is a fiduciary and 
owed a fiduciary duty to all members (which includes spouses). And, it seemed 
unconcerned that page 2 of the Application for Service Retirement Benefit was unsigned, 
shrugging off, without comment, Judy Lund's statement that the Board only "presumes 
the member has selected the right plan" and does nothing else to verify it (in violation of 
its own page 2 requirement). Finally, it does not identify the standard of review for 
decisions of law by the Board - no deference - but instead cites inapplicable case law 
dealing with code section interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing, we respectfully request that the appeal be granted on the 
terms previously stated: (1) that the Application for Service Retirement be disregarded as 
incomplete and legally ineffective, and that her 2005 request to receive the annuity be 
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granted under §49-13-405(2); or alternatively, (2) that the legislative and administrative 
scheme here discussed be declared unconstitutional, that the Board be reversed, and that 
the ALJ be ordered to grant Appellant her annuity; or in the event the Court seeks the 
Board's view of the constitutional issues raised in this proceeding, (3) that a remand to 
the Administrative Law Judge be made pursuant to Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l*_ day of March, 2006. 
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